Demosthenes and the Unity of the Greeks

(An essay on the Demosthenes` political speeches)


"United in diversity"
(motto of the EU, according to the first European Constitution)


The purpose of this text (1) is, first of all to examine the question: to what extent were the Greeks unified as a community in the second half of the IV century B.C., and what kind of unity was that? However, on the other hand, what I am going to say will by all means refer to the present situation in Europe. The past two weeks have revealed quite clearly, that the Europeans are not sure they want to live in one state, or in a union resembling a state.
This has caused concern in those among them, who for the last 50 years have believed that the existence of such a state will be for the good and who have devoted their efforts for its creation, or who have merely hoped it to appear. The concern is no less for those who, for the time being, live outside the political boundaries of what is going to become such a state, but who wish to be part of it. It has become clear now that many citizens of European countries who have cooperated, agreed with, or at least tolerated the establishment of this state already declare they are not going to cooperate or even endure it any more. It is not easy to say what will happen. Let us assume that the question now is: how united can Europe be? And further on: how big can Europe be and still remain united? And lastly: can Europe not be united to the extent presumed in the Constitution, and also to the present-day extent, and nevertheless remain peaceful and free? By virtue of my profession, and also out of necessity – since this is the part from human history I have dealt mostly with - I will make an attempt to consider these issues with the help of what happened in Greece at the end of the epoch of the free city states. For during the 4th century B. C. and earlier as well, Greece encountered difficulties with its unity. It was sometimes willing to be united, but never – apart from some rare occasions, for a short time and only partially – did it achieve that. So, I am going to look at these difficulties, which seem to me not quite different from the ones we encounter today, and I am going to do this with the help of what Demosthenes stated in his speeches.


I. Demosthenes’ s cause

Demosthenes is known mainly for his speeches against Philip of Macedon, or, more particularly, for his speeches arguing for the necessity of an active and unified Greek resistance against Philip, who by that time seemed quite ambitious and unlikely to be satisfied solely with the conquering of south Thrace and north Greece up to Thessalia. But from his earlier political speeches it is evident that he would embrace such a cause on another occasion as well. In his “On the symmoriai” (On the Navy-Boards) the subject is the need for intensified military preparations against the Persian threat, and in his “On the Liberty of the Rhodians” he pleaded for immediate military intervention in Rhodes, where democracy had to be re-established and the local oligarchs – removed, since they were dependent on Artemisia, the queen of Caria (the widow of the famous Mausol). These speeches reveal that Demosthenes took the following position as a politician.
The Greek cities, according to him, each by itself and as a whole, were threatened by a barbarian invasion. The dangers from the barbarian invasion seemed to lay not so much in the damages, accompanying each war (because the Greeks themselves used to cause enough such damages to one another), as in the fact that it inevitably, and maybe permanently, destroyed liberty. Since barbarians were not familiar with democracy, they were always under monarchy rule, which was equal to tyranny. (Demosthenes did not use the distinction ‘tyrant – king’ employed by almost all influential political thinkers, including Aristotle). But, on the other hand, even if some Greeks did not deem monarchy or oligarchy unacceptable (and there were such people), they should be worried by the threat of the barbarian as a non-Greek – that is someone who could commit all kinds of crime, anything. The Greeks were unable to handle separately with the pressure of the strong barbarian states, and therefore they needed union. That union should have an initiator, who should at the same time possess the potential of being a leader. And there was Athens, strong enough as a city to be a leader. Moreover, it had already been one. And something more. Athens, being a democratic city-state, could guarantee the freedom of all Greeks even if accepted as the only leader, because it never supported tyrants and oligarchs, but offered its opposition – the self-governing, i.e. democracy.
So, Demosthenes is the spokesman of those Athenians who see the future of their city as a leader of all Greeks in the face of a serious and incessant threat. The unity he is advocating is a “must” if the Greeks want to evade the yoke at all. Otherwise, there is no necessity for them to be united, because nowhere in his speeches he mentions that peace and welfare are satisfactory ends in themselves.


II. The balance of the powers

When speaking about Athens as a leader and initiator of the Greek union, Demosthenes refers to something as a tradition in the Greek history during the previous 140-150 years. This is the tradition of the unions electing the cities, which become “patrons of the Greeks”. Prior to the Persian offensive against the European Greeks the polises had been disunited, they hadn’t established great unions and they lead regular, although insignificant wars against each other. Moreover they had been over-occupied with their internal warfare, which had impeded the consistent diplomatic activity and made all unions and pacts unreliable. It could be assumed, that for the first time the Greeks began to consider a union during the Ionian revolt (499-494 B.C.) against Persia, which was reigning over the Greeks inhabiting the coast of Asia Minor through city-monarchs (tyrants), controlled by the Persian king. This union could both be successful and sustain the independence of Asian Greeks, had it been more resistant. However, in a fatal sea battle near Miletus the Greeks were defeated. According to Herodotus, that happened largely through the fault of the men from Samos who were strong in naval affairs, but suddenly hesitated, left the united navy, and although dependent on the Persians, managed to keep their island and its inhabitants safe and secure. This union didn’t have an outstanding leader, but had an initiator – the polis of Miletus, lead by a couple of its citizens. They were tyrants of the city for some time - supported by Persia - but later decided that they were too closely and severely controlled by the king – in other words, that they could fall victims of his arbitrariness at any time, and therefore organized the uprising.
The next union appeared after the victories of the European Greeks in 490 and 480. It was more lasting, but had one, and very strong at that, leader – Athens, which managed to win almost on its own the important battles at Marathon and Salamis. After the second victory the Athenians enhanced the democracy in their city, formed an anti-Persian union embracing many islands and continental cities outside Peloponnese, allocated a relatively large budget of the union and eventually usurped the right to manage this budget almost uncontrolled. Thus Athens acquired extraordinary wealth, and not a single from the cities-contributors, which saw how their money was spent, could leave the union against the will of the Athenians. The most decisive separatist attempt was made by the citizens of Samos (440-439 B.C), but Athens was already too powerful and attacked the island retaining it in the union.
Thus the Athenians lost their credibility with the majority of Greeks and provoked the enmity of Sparta. This enmity, according to Thucydides, caused the Peloponnesian war. And judging from the speech delivered by Pericles, which he included in his “History”, and also from some actions such as the unexpected and quite spectacular expedition to the West against Syracuse, the pretensions of Athens had grown too much for the 60-70 years following the Peloponnesian wars and they intended not only to preserve the union, but also to expand their influence far beyond the Aegean Sea. They even considered something as an empire, which was to include all the Greeks and not only them. However, they were defeated in the war and thus the first serious project for the unification of Greece collapsed at the end of the 5th century. That project seemed to have been an imperial one. The Athenians never managed or dared to repeat it again, and did not even think about it, as it can be assumed from the speeches by Demosthenes. He speaks explicitly about the danger for one polis (whichever it might be) to become over-powerful. As it can be seen in the “History” by Thucydides, Athens from the middle of the 5th century boasts with its political model and its achievements, and points out its advantages over Sparta. Athens from the middle of the 4th century, 100 years later, continues to insist on the merits of democracy, but sees its role simply as a leader which will offer the Greeks protection both against any foreign invasion, and also against increased domination of any of the Greek polises over the rest. Hence, it is not going to be a patron, demanding unconditional leadership over the others, but rather a center of the resistance against the barbarians and a guarantee for the independence of any Greek city, as much as possible. In brief, Athens does not want an empire, but a union of independent states, which may grow into a military union upon necessity, but provided that the separate states remain sovereign.
When speaking about these matters, Demosthenes has in mind the developments after the end of the Peloponnesian war. The Lacedaemonians did not allow the devastation of Athens, probably because they were aware that it would only lead to a change of the enemy, since then the center of influence in the North would move to Thebes, Corinth or even to their old rival Argos. For them, an oligarchic and controlled Athens was more convenient. Or maybe they just feared the very abrupt change in the entire Greek world, which might follow the disappearance of such a powerful state.
However, only ten years later the Lacedemonians had to fight against a coalition of several cities, one of which was Athens, once again democratized and recovering; and they had to resort to the support of the Persian king. Twenty more years later they were heavily and ignominiously defeated by Thebes, which made Thebes so mighty, that the Spartans in turn were threatened with destruction and then Athens helped them. Thus the balance of the powers was kept once again and it was becoming clear that the polises were not simply unwilling, but in fact would never allow any of them to achieve exceptional domination. It also became clear that this type of union seemed already impossible, and preserving the status quo would only provoke new and ever graver wars. All that would not have seemed so horrifying, if Philip of Macedon (382-336 B.C.) had limited himself with the control over the territories between the Adriatic Sea, Thessalia and the Black Sea Straits. But it was already evident that he was eager for much more.

(1) This text was read at the symposium “European Integration in Philosophical Perspective”, 10-11 June, 2005, organized by the Italian Cultural Institute in Sofia and the Philosophical Faculty at the Sofia University.

(follows in Monday, October 15)