Herodotus and the Parts of the World

II. Egypt*

The paper deals with Herodotus' description of Egypt in the second book of the “History”. The Greek view of the Egypt’s civilization, and, more specifically, how the Greeks were impressed by Egypt and how they conceived the Egyptian impact to their own civilization is the main topic discussed. Next, suggestions are made Egypt as a productive object of western cultural imagination and as a symbol of the eastern civilization model with its positive and negative aspects.

The paper is divided into the following chapters:

1. The Description of Egypt and the Meaning of the Word “History”
2. Egypt and the Greeks
3. Plato and Egypt


*the paper is published in:
ORIENTALIA. A Journal for the East. 2005, 2. New Bulgarian University

(Charles Gleyre, Egyptian Temple, 1840. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, English - "Marc-Charles-Gabriel Gleyre")

Demosthenes and the Unity of the Greeks II

Philip II

(continues from Friday, April 27)

III. The failure of Athens

Demosthenes himself seems to hold the opinion that Athens is already decaying as political and military force and therefore doesn't possess good potential for struggle against Macedonia. Besides, the mood in the different speeches is different: prior to the entrance of Philip in Phocis and even before the capture of Olynthus, Philip seems threatening, but still fightable. But after his march to the south of Thermopylae it becomes clear, that the capacities of Athenians to confront him are suspicious, and, what is worse, that the peace seems hardly negotiable.
It already clear that Philip doesn't want a lasting peace with anybody, whereas the Greek states, including the Athenians, have deluded themselves that he is offering them peace. That’s why the mood from the First Philippics onwards becomes more pessimistic, although Demosthenes keeps on speaking about the necessity of resistance and points to the proper measures to be undertaken. However, his attention splits: on the one side he speaks about the coordinate actions between the cities and the organization of the resistance, but on the other he is more frequently ruminating on the topic: “Why this happened?”
A step aside. Today Europe is not threatened either by an over-ambitious conqueror as Philip, or even by the Islamist terrorism, but rather by the fear, that “the things are not going as earlier”. Indeed, it is slightly believable that peoples will become richer and richer, and this will go on endlessly. Always comes a moment, when their wealth and even their culture begin to raise the interest of the neighbors. Then comes the time to act. And Europe really acts through its present day leaders, but some of the effects lead to undesirable changes (people do not merely get richer; sometimes other things happen) and the discontent appears. It is this discontent, caused by the fear, that is the real enemy of Europe today. And due to the fact that today it seems quite strong, the politicians and the troubled citizens, just like Demosthenes, ask themselves both the questions: not only “What is to be done?” but also “Why it happened like that?” And if the asking of the latter question becomes more and more frequent, this will be a sign that the situation worsens.
Demosthenes sees the following causes for the weakness of Athens. First of all, paradoxically, the democracy with its procedures impedes the necessary reaction of the state in critical circumstances. Unlike the Athenian politicians, Philip of Macedon takes all the decisions by himself: he commands the army, he presides the negotiations (if not he in person, the messengers lead them instead of him; these people would never dare to work in favour of another Macedonian, opponent to Philip); he allocates the money and is unaccountable to anyone. No one can sue against him; no one can interrupt him after speaking for a certain time at the assembly; his proposals are not subjected to a vote, because he is not making proposals, he just commands. All this still does not mean that Demosthenes is complaining of the democracy. But he says, that there are moments, when the city should behave as one, and not only the city, but also all Greeks. If this does not happen, the democracy the independence itself, which cause such delays in the communal decision-making, will be destroyed.
The second problem is the corruption. There are Athenian politicians, Demosthenes says, who are simply working for Philip; the are paid, or at least something is promised to them, or they are just hoping to gain power over the city, after the loss of its independence. However, no one can prove their guiltiness indisputably and condemn them. And the people do not worry about their deeds, because they, unlike Demosthenes, assure the citizens, that everything is in order, that the city is powerful enough, and Philip is harmless; or even that he is already an ally.
And finally, the mere laziness of the Athenians is a problem and it is caused by the irresponsible redistribution of the money of the state. The Athenians are accustomed to many feasts, and moreover they are visited by many foreigners. The mere presence of the Athenian people as audience at these feasts is paid by the state treasury and no one can offer these money to be spent on something else – for example on shipbuilding. Shortly, the Athenians are convinced that they live better than the rest of the Greeks and they are reluctant to be deprived from this social acquisition. That’s why they think the situation is not that serious, as described by Demosthenes. Such a city seems sentenced to loose its political significance and precisely this had happened. In the centuries that followed the polises had made several attempts to gain independence – either from Macedonia, or from Rome – but Athens didn’t take part in these developments, and the center of resistance had moved to the south - to Corinth and the Peloponnesian cities.

IV. The unity of the Greeks

/follows/

(Philip II of Macedon: victory medal (niketerion) struck in Tarsus, c. 2nd BCE. Cabinet des Médailles, Paris. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, English - "Demosthenes")

Herodotus and the Parts of the World

I. The Reign of Darius*

The paper focuses on the supposed cultural differences between the Greeks and the barbarians (represented mostly by the Persian empire), as seen by Herodotus. The observations are limited on the material of books III-VI, where the reader is told about the unsuccessful Ionian revolt and the first Persian war against the European Greeks, which had ended with the battle at Marathon. The main point of the essay is the specific Greek way of political expansion, and its possible parallels with the contemporary European model.
The paper is divided into the following chapters.
1. Persia and the Greeks. The clash.
2. The Parts of the World.
3. The Unity of the Greeks. The Greeks as a Maritime People. The Role of the Oracle at Delphi.
4. The Greek Fear in front of Persia.
5. Monarchy and Democracy. The Greek Understanding of the Freedom.


*the paper is published in:
ORIENTALIA. A Journal for the East. 2005, 1. New Bulgarian University

Demosthenes and the Unity of the Greeks

(An essay on the Demosthenes` political speeches)


"United in diversity"
(motto of the EU, according to the first European Constitution)


The purpose of this text (1) is, first of all to examine the question: to what extent were the Greeks unified as a community in the second half of the IV century B.C., and what kind of unity was that? However, on the other hand, what I am going to say will by all means refer to the present situation in Europe. The past two weeks have revealed quite clearly, that the Europeans are not sure they want to live in one state, or in a union resembling a state.
This has caused concern in those among them, who for the last 50 years have believed that the existence of such a state will be for the good and who have devoted their efforts for its creation, or who have merely hoped it to appear. The concern is no less for those who, for the time being, live outside the political boundaries of what is going to become such a state, but who wish to be part of it. It has become clear now that many citizens of European countries who have cooperated, agreed with, or at least tolerated the establishment of this state already declare they are not going to cooperate or even endure it any more. It is not easy to say what will happen. Let us assume that the question now is: how united can Europe be? And further on: how big can Europe be and still remain united? And lastly: can Europe not be united to the extent presumed in the Constitution, and also to the present-day extent, and nevertheless remain peaceful and free? By virtue of my profession, and also out of necessity – since this is the part from human history I have dealt mostly with - I will make an attempt to consider these issues with the help of what happened in Greece at the end of the epoch of the free city states. For during the 4th century B. C. and earlier as well, Greece encountered difficulties with its unity. It was sometimes willing to be united, but never – apart from some rare occasions, for a short time and only partially – did it achieve that. So, I am going to look at these difficulties, which seem to me not quite different from the ones we encounter today, and I am going to do this with the help of what Demosthenes stated in his speeches.


I. Demosthenes’ s cause

Demosthenes is known mainly for his speeches against Philip of Macedon, or, more particularly, for his speeches arguing for the necessity of an active and unified Greek resistance against Philip, who by that time seemed quite ambitious and unlikely to be satisfied solely with the conquering of south Thrace and north Greece up to Thessalia. But from his earlier political speeches it is evident that he would embrace such a cause on another occasion as well. In his “On the symmoriai” (On the Navy-Boards) the subject is the need for intensified military preparations against the Persian threat, and in his “On the Liberty of the Rhodians” he pleaded for immediate military intervention in Rhodes, where democracy had to be re-established and the local oligarchs – removed, since they were dependent on Artemisia, the queen of Caria (the widow of the famous Mausol). These speeches reveal that Demosthenes took the following position as a politician.
The Greek cities, according to him, each by itself and as a whole, were threatened by a barbarian invasion. The dangers from the barbarian invasion seemed to lay not so much in the damages, accompanying each war (because the Greeks themselves used to cause enough such damages to one another), as in the fact that it inevitably, and maybe permanently, destroyed liberty. Since barbarians were not familiar with democracy, they were always under monarchy rule, which was equal to tyranny. (Demosthenes did not use the distinction ‘tyrant – king’ employed by almost all influential political thinkers, including Aristotle). But, on the other hand, even if some Greeks did not deem monarchy or oligarchy unacceptable (and there were such people), they should be worried by the threat of the barbarian as a non-Greek – that is someone who could commit all kinds of crime, anything. The Greeks were unable to handle separately with the pressure of the strong barbarian states, and therefore they needed union. That union should have an initiator, who should at the same time possess the potential of being a leader. And there was Athens, strong enough as a city to be a leader. Moreover, it had already been one. And something more. Athens, being a democratic city-state, could guarantee the freedom of all Greeks even if accepted as the only leader, because it never supported tyrants and oligarchs, but offered its opposition – the self-governing, i.e. democracy.
So, Demosthenes is the spokesman of those Athenians who see the future of their city as a leader of all Greeks in the face of a serious and incessant threat. The unity he is advocating is a “must” if the Greeks want to evade the yoke at all. Otherwise, there is no necessity for them to be united, because nowhere in his speeches he mentions that peace and welfare are satisfactory ends in themselves.


II. The balance of the powers

When speaking about Athens as a leader and initiator of the Greek union, Demosthenes refers to something as a tradition in the Greek history during the previous 140-150 years. This is the tradition of the unions electing the cities, which become “patrons of the Greeks”. Prior to the Persian offensive against the European Greeks the polises had been disunited, they hadn’t established great unions and they lead regular, although insignificant wars against each other. Moreover they had been over-occupied with their internal warfare, which had impeded the consistent diplomatic activity and made all unions and pacts unreliable. It could be assumed, that for the first time the Greeks began to consider a union during the Ionian revolt (499-494 B.C.) against Persia, which was reigning over the Greeks inhabiting the coast of Asia Minor through city-monarchs (tyrants), controlled by the Persian king. This union could both be successful and sustain the independence of Asian Greeks, had it been more resistant. However, in a fatal sea battle near Miletus the Greeks were defeated. According to Herodotus, that happened largely through the fault of the men from Samos who were strong in naval affairs, but suddenly hesitated, left the united navy, and although dependent on the Persians, managed to keep their island and its inhabitants safe and secure. This union didn’t have an outstanding leader, but had an initiator – the polis of Miletus, lead by a couple of its citizens. They were tyrants of the city for some time - supported by Persia - but later decided that they were too closely and severely controlled by the king – in other words, that they could fall victims of his arbitrariness at any time, and therefore organized the uprising.
The next union appeared after the victories of the European Greeks in 490 and 480. It was more lasting, but had one, and very strong at that, leader – Athens, which managed to win almost on its own the important battles at Marathon and Salamis. After the second victory the Athenians enhanced the democracy in their city, formed an anti-Persian union embracing many islands and continental cities outside Peloponnese, allocated a relatively large budget of the union and eventually usurped the right to manage this budget almost uncontrolled. Thus Athens acquired extraordinary wealth, and not a single from the cities-contributors, which saw how their money was spent, could leave the union against the will of the Athenians. The most decisive separatist attempt was made by the citizens of Samos (440-439 B.C), but Athens was already too powerful and attacked the island retaining it in the union.
Thus the Athenians lost their credibility with the majority of Greeks and provoked the enmity of Sparta. This enmity, according to Thucydides, caused the Peloponnesian war. And judging from the speech delivered by Pericles, which he included in his “History”, and also from some actions such as the unexpected and quite spectacular expedition to the West against Syracuse, the pretensions of Athens had grown too much for the 60-70 years following the Peloponnesian wars and they intended not only to preserve the union, but also to expand their influence far beyond the Aegean Sea. They even considered something as an empire, which was to include all the Greeks and not only them. However, they were defeated in the war and thus the first serious project for the unification of Greece collapsed at the end of the 5th century. That project seemed to have been an imperial one. The Athenians never managed or dared to repeat it again, and did not even think about it, as it can be assumed from the speeches by Demosthenes. He speaks explicitly about the danger for one polis (whichever it might be) to become over-powerful. As it can be seen in the “History” by Thucydides, Athens from the middle of the 5th century boasts with its political model and its achievements, and points out its advantages over Sparta. Athens from the middle of the 4th century, 100 years later, continues to insist on the merits of democracy, but sees its role simply as a leader which will offer the Greeks protection both against any foreign invasion, and also against increased domination of any of the Greek polises over the rest. Hence, it is not going to be a patron, demanding unconditional leadership over the others, but rather a center of the resistance against the barbarians and a guarantee for the independence of any Greek city, as much as possible. In brief, Athens does not want an empire, but a union of independent states, which may grow into a military union upon necessity, but provided that the separate states remain sovereign.
When speaking about these matters, Demosthenes has in mind the developments after the end of the Peloponnesian war. The Lacedaemonians did not allow the devastation of Athens, probably because they were aware that it would only lead to a change of the enemy, since then the center of influence in the North would move to Thebes, Corinth or even to their old rival Argos. For them, an oligarchic and controlled Athens was more convenient. Or maybe they just feared the very abrupt change in the entire Greek world, which might follow the disappearance of such a powerful state.
However, only ten years later the Lacedemonians had to fight against a coalition of several cities, one of which was Athens, once again democratized and recovering; and they had to resort to the support of the Persian king. Twenty more years later they were heavily and ignominiously defeated by Thebes, which made Thebes so mighty, that the Spartans in turn were threatened with destruction and then Athens helped them. Thus the balance of the powers was kept once again and it was becoming clear that the polises were not simply unwilling, but in fact would never allow any of them to achieve exceptional domination. It also became clear that this type of union seemed already impossible, and preserving the status quo would only provoke new and ever graver wars. All that would not have seemed so horrifying, if Philip of Macedon (382-336 B.C.) had limited himself with the control over the territories between the Adriatic Sea, Thessalia and the Black Sea Straits. But it was already evident that he was eager for much more.

(1) This text was read at the symposium “European Integration in Philosophical Perspective”, 10-11 June, 2005, organized by the Italian Cultural Institute in Sofia and the Philosophical Faculty at the Sofia University.

(follows in Monday, October 15)